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Chapter 8

Not Like the South? Regional Variation and
Political Participation through the Lens of
Section 2
Ellen D. Katz
University of Michigan Law School

Introduction
On July 27, 2006, President Bush signed into law a twenty-five-year extension
of the expiring provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).1 Among the provisions reauthorized is the preclearance process, a procedure that constitutes the
VRA’s most remarkable and notorious requirement. Included in Section 5 of the
original 1965 statute, preclearance reverses the presumption of validity that
typically attaches to state and local legislative and administrative action. It mandates that “covered” jurisdictions—defined as those that used a voting “test or
device” and had extremely low levels of voter registration or turnout measured
as of various dates beginning in 1964—obtain approval from federal officials
before implementing any changes in their voting laws and procedures.2
Ellen Katz is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
Jenna Bednar, Chandler Davidson, Daniel Halberstam, Rick Hasen, Don Herzog, J. J.
Prescott, and Scott Shapiro for helpful comments, Charles Doriean and Ryan Nunn for
statistical work, and Anna Baldwin and Emma Cheuse for excellent research assistance
and for their sustained contributions to the VRI. Thanks also to the Chief Justice Earl
Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity at Boalt Hall School of Law and the
University of Michigan Law School, which provided generous financial support for this
project.
1
See Hamil R. Harris and Michael Abramowitz, Bush Signs Voting Rights Act Extension, WASH. POST, July 28, 2006.
2
As originally enacted, Section 5 mandates that “covered” jurisdictions demonstrate
that a proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect” of denying or abridging the right to vote based on race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). As reautho183
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Few would dispute that preclearance has been largely responsible for the
VRA’s remarkable efficacy in eliminating deep-rooted racial barriers to political
participation in covered jurisdictions.3 What is contested is whether this requirement remains justified.4 Discrimination in voting persists, but is it sufficiently dire
to warrant retention of Section 5’s burden shifting regime? Is, moreover, the discrimination that persists in covered jurisdictions sufficiently different from the
discriminatory practices voters confront in other parts of the country to justify
keeping only the previously covered jurisdictions subject to the strictures of preclearance?5
It is widely assumed that the reauthorization of Section 5 will survive constitutional scrutiny only if the record Congress amassed to support the statute documents pervasive unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions for which preclearance offers a remedy.6 This chapter takes issue with this assumption. It argues
rized, Section 5 requires that the change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect.”
3
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its
Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1712–14 (2004) (arguing data shows that “[n]o
longer are blacks political outsiders in the covered jurisdictions”); Chandler Davidson
and Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 381
(C. Davidson and B. Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]; NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW, PROTECTING MINORITY VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982–2005, at
37, 40–49 (Chandler Davidson ed., Feb. 2006).
4
For examples of those arguing it is not, see, for example, EDWARD BLUM AND LAUREN CAMPBELL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, ASSESSMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN JURISDICTIONS COVERED UNDER SECTION FIVE
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 2-3 (May 17, 2006), at http://www.aei.org/publications/
pubID. 24405,filter.all/pub_detail.asp (arguing that the AEI Bullock-Gaddie voting studies have found “no crisis in minority voting rights in 2006” and “no quantifiable difference” between covered and noncovered jurisdictions justifying the Act’s renewal); A Bill
to Reauthorize and Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Part I): Hearing on H.R. 9
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on the Const. Regarding the Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, 109th Cong. (May 4, 2006) [hereinafter House Reauthorization Hearings] (statement of Roger Clegg, President, Center for Equal Opportunity, at 6–7); An Introduction to the Expiring Provisions of the Voting Rights Act and
Legal Issues Relating to Reauthorization, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (May 9, 2006) [hereinafter Senate Reauthorization Hearings] (statement of
Samuel Issacharoff, Professor, NYU School of Law, at 1) (arguing that “it is far from
clear that the injustices that justified Section 5 in 1965 can justify its unqualified reenactment today”); id. (May 17, 2006) (statement of Abigail Thernstrom, senior fellow,
Manhattan Institute).
5
See, e.g., House Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Roger
Clegg, president, Center for Equal Opportunity, at 6–7) (criticizing the record prepared
by Congress partly for its failure to compare covered and noncovered jurisdictions).
6
See id. (statement of J. Gerald Hebert, former attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division, at 3) (affirming the record created as sufficient to satisfy City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); id. (statement of Debo Adegbile, Associate Di-
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that recent Supreme Court precedent requiring such a record for new congressional legislation enforcing civil rights ought not apply when Congress renews an
existing, operational statute such as Section 5. In this context, the record must
make the case for the continuing need for preclearance, as opposed to the need for
this legislation in the first instance. A record of pervasive unconstitutional conduct
should not be expected since the legislation at issue was put in place to remedy
precisely such conduct. Indeed, to require such a record would mean that only
ineffective statutes are entitled to reauthorization.7
The continuing need for existing legislation like Section 5 requires not documentation of existing unconstitutional conduct but instead speculation about the
scope of such conduct absent the preclearance requirement. To be sure, the quality
of political participation in covered jurisdictions operating without the constraints
imposed by Section 5 can hardly be predicted with certainty.8 Nevertheless, an
important source of information regarding the operation of the statute and the continued need for it is found in judicial decisions construing Section 2, the VRA’s
core permanent provision.
As amended in 1982, Section 2 of the VRA proscribes electoral practices that
result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a particular language-minority group.9 While Section 2 differs from
Section 5 in significant ways,10 Section 2 litigation illuminates the Section 5 derector of Litigation, NAACP-LDEF, at 16) (calling the record compiled by Congress a
“strong” one); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of
Richard Hasen, professor, Loyola Law School) (arguing that the record provided may not
be enough to reauthorize under City of Boerne in the form of proposed bill H.R. 9); id.
(statement of Laughlin McDonald, director, ACLU Voting Rights Project) (calling the
record provided by Congress sufficient to meet the Boerne standard). But see id. (statement of Pamela S. Karlan, professor of public interest law, Stanford University School of
Law, at 15).
7
For development of this idea and an evaluation of alternate standards that might
apply, see Ellen D. Katz, Judicial Review and the Voting Rights Act (working draft on file
with author); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings, supra note 4 (May 16, 2006)
(statement of Pamela S. Karlan, professor of public interest law, Stanford University
School of Law, at 15) (“The question whether Congress can continue coverage of the
already covered jurisdictions . . . does not require that Congress conclude that if it were
writing on a completely clean slate today, it would choose the original triggering formulas. Rather, it depends on whether continuing to subject the covered jurisdictions to the
preclearance regime is congruent and proportional to preventing future constitutional
injury.”).
8
Cf. Richard Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of
the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 177, 179 (2005) (“The
question of how much racial discrimination in voting practices there would be today if we
suddenly eliminated preclearance is almost too speculative to answer.”).
9
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
10
Unlike Section 5, Section 2 applies nationwide and importantly presumes state action to be valid absent proof establishing a statutory violation. Section 2 prohibits some
conduct that might pass muster under Section 5 and permits various practices for which
preclearance would be denied. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (districting
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bate in important respects. Most notably, the very complexity of the Section 2
inquiry renders judicial opinions addressing these claims a rich source of valuable
information detailing political participation in the defendant jurisdictions.
Under Section 2, an electoral practice results in a denial or abridgment of the
right to vote if, based on the “totality of circumstances,” minority voters have “less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”11 Addressing the “totality of
circumstances,” in turn, includes consideration of nine factors listed in the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied the 1982 amendments to Section 2.
These so-called Senate Factors include: the existence of racial polarization in voting, a dearth of successful candidates from the minority group, racial appeals in
campaigns, unresponsive elected officials, and a long history of official discrimination in virtually every realm of public life.12
For nearly a quarter century, federal judges nationwide have been evaluating
these factors when adjudicating claims under Section 2. They have produced 763
published opinions involving 331 lawsuits in which they make thousands of factual findings.13 A systematic analysis of these findings yields a complex portrait of
political participation in the jurisdictions involved, one that reveals many similari-

plan’s apparent compliance with Section 2 does not establish preclearance is warranted
under Section 5); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (Bossier
Parish I) (apparent violation of Section 2 not grounds to deny preclearance under Section
5).
11
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
12
S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 27–30 (1982) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT] (listing nine
factors to measure the “totality of circumstances” under Section 2).
13
See Ellen D. Katz with M. Aisenbrey, A. Baldwin, E. Cheuse, and A. Weisbrodt,
Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act Since 1982, Final Report of the Voting Rights Initiative, 39 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 643, 654 (2006) [hereinafter “Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination”]; see
also 2006 VRI Database Master List, available at http://www.votingreport.org (instructions on how to search and sort data are located within the Master List) [hereinafter “VRI
Database Master List”].
Of all Section 2 litigation, 331 lawsuits produced at least one published or reported
opinion considering a Section 2 claim between the passage of the 1982 amendment and
December 31, 2005. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra, at 650–54 (describing research objectives and project design). The 331 lawsuits include some lawsuits
that have not yet resulted in a final, unappealable decision, but for which at least one
opinion was published within the specified time period. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 2004
WL 1335921 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), remanded by Hayden v. Pataki, 2006 WL 1493837 (2d
Cir. Jun 01, 2006). The findings noted in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in LULAC
v. Perry are included because this case produced published opinions before 2006. See 126
S. Ct. 2594 (2006). This study does not include lawsuits that did not produce a published
opinion before 2006. Examples of such lawsuits include Cottier v. City of Martin, 445
F.3d 1113 (8th Cir. 2006); Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 2006 WL 681048 (N.D. Ill. 2006);
Quinn v. Pauley, 2006 WL 752965 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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ties between covered and noncovered jurisdictions, as well as a number of significant differences.14
This chapter proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an overview of the judicial
findings in published Section 2 decisions, focusing in particular on how these findings differ between covered and noncovered jurisdictions. Briefly stated, more
courts in covered jurisdictions reached outcomes favorable to plaintiffs, and did so
in a greater proportion of the lawsuits they decided, than did courts in noncovered
jurisdictions, a difference that is statistically significant at the 90% level. More
plaintiffs successfully challenged local electoral practices and did so in a greater
proportion of the successful lawsuits in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered
ones, a difference that is also statistically significant at the 90% level. Successful
plaintiff challenges to local practices in both covered and noncovered jurisdictions
exceeded the number of such challenges to statewide ones.15
Courts in covered jurisdictions have both found and been more likely to find
at levels that are statistically significant: acts of official discrimination that compromise voting rights, the use of devices that “enhance[ ]”16 opportunities for discrimination against minority voters, and a lack of success by minority candidates.
Courts in covered jurisdictions have also found and been more likely to find a
lower level of minority voter registration and turnout, contemporary voting opportunities shaped by the continuing effects of discrimination in various socioeconomic realms, racial appeals in campaigns, and tenuous justifications underlying challenged practices, although these differences between covered and noncovered jurisdictions are not statistically significant.
In roughly equal numbers and proportions, courts in covered and noncovered
jurisdictions have found racially exclusive slating processes and nonresponsive
elected officials. Courts in both types of jurisdictions also found legally significant
racial bloc voting in a roughly equal number of lawsuits, but courts in covered

14

To be sure, this portrait is necessarily incomplete. The study underlying this paper
tracks only Section 2 lawsuits that produced an opinion that was published on Westlaw or
LexisNexis. It does not consider unpublished opinions, claims that settled without a published judicial opinion, or claims that plaintiffs otherwise failed to pursue after filing. As
important, the survey does not (and indeed could not) consider jurisdictions in which
Section 2 cases were not filed. Whether due to the prevalence of nondiscriminatory practices or a lack of resources to challenge discriminatory ones, the absence of such claims
means that courts never examined opportunities for political participation in these jurisdictions and never produced the findings that a Section 2 inquiry would yield. As a consequence, the published Section 2 decisions do not offer an all-inclusive depiction of
political participation and voting discrimination nationwide, but instead may be best understood as offering selective snapshots of political participation within the jurisdictions
involved. These snapshots are themselves valuable for the rich detail they convey and for
the more generalized, albeit necessarily qualified conclusions that may be extrapolated
from them.
15
See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also Appendix, Tables 8.1 and
8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
16
SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.
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jurisdictions documented voting patterns that were more extremely polarized by
race at a rate that is statistically significant.
Part II assesses the significance of these differences. It observes that the Section 2 findings do not establish the sort of record of recent unconstitutional conduct that the Supreme Court has required in cases involving new congressional
legislation. It argues, however, that renewal of an operational statute such as Section 5 demands not a record of unconstitutional conduct, but instead a record that
suggests the scope of such conduct in the absence of the statute. Part II then considers changes the Section 2 findings suggest might occur in covered jurisdictions
absent Section 5. It argues that these findings both suggest that past discrimination
in covered jurisdictions has yet to be fully remedied and portend future discrimination absent the deterrent effect of preclearance. Finally, Part III presents the chapter’s conclusions.

I. Section 2 Claims in Covered and Noncovered Jurisdictions
Several courts adjudicating Section 2 claims in noncovered regions go out of
their way to distinguish the jurisdictions involved from those subject to Section
5’s preclearance requirement. A First Circuit panel, for example, stated that
“Boston’s history of discrimination in the area of voting rights was less egregious than in certain other parts of the country.”17 A district court in New York
similarly stated that “[no]thing in the history of New York [state] even remotely
approaches the systematic exclusion of blacks from the political process that
existed in the South.”18
Differences certainly abound, but so do similarities. Judicial findings in Section 2 cases reveal a complex and nuanced view of the relative opportunities for
minority political participation in covered and noncovered jurisdictions—one that
suggests that distinct problems persist in covered jurisdictions.

A. The Cases
Three hundred and thirty-one lawsuits addressed Section 2 claims between
1982 and December 2005. Although eleven more lawsuits originated in noncovered jurisdictions than in covered ones, more plaintiffs prevailed overall and in a
17

1986).

Latino Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 412 (1st Cir.

18
Reed v. Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 886 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Abigail Thernstrom, Thernstrom Report, Def.Exh.R., at 11) (citing Nathan Glazer and Reed
Ueda, Policy Against Prejudice and Discrimination, in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 852–54 (Stephan Thernstrom ed., Harvard University Press
1980)); see also Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1147, 1151 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Rybicki, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1110–12 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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greater proportion of the cases decided in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered
ones, a difference that is statistically significant at the 90% level.19
Plaintiffs in sixty-eight lawsuits met the three “preconditions” to a Section 2
claim that the Supreme Court articulated in its 1986 decision Thornburg v.
Gingles.20 More courts found the Gingles preconditions in noncovered jurisdictions, although courts in both types of jurisdiction found them in a roughly equal
proportion of the lawsuits in which they considered them. More plaintiffs crossed
the Gingles threshold in noncovered jurisdictions, but plaintiffs who did so prevailed in a greater proportion of the cases published in covered jurisdictions.21
State vs. Local Practices

In both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, many more Section 2 lawsuits challenged local electoral practices than statewide ones, and in both types
of jurisdictions, plaintiffs were more likely to prevail in local suits than in statewide ones. Even so, in covered jurisdictions, the focus on local practices has
been more pronounced. More plaintiffs challenged local procedures in covered
jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, local challenges comprised a greater proportion of the lawsuits plaintiffs brought in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered, and plaintiffs prevailed in a greater proportion of the local challenges
in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered, differences that are statistically significant at the 90% level. Plaintiffs achieved favorable outcomes in 46.7% of
Section 2 lawsuits challenging local practices in covered jurisdictions, and
35.4% of such suits in noncovered jurisdictions.22
19
See Appendix, Table 8.1; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz
et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56. Plaintiffs achieved successful outcomes in 123 (or 37.2%) of the total lawsuits. Of these successful suits, ninetytwo documented a violation of Section 2— either on the merits or in the course of another
favorable determination for the plaintiff. Another thirty-one lawsuits made a favorable
determination for the plaintiff (such as issuing a preliminary injunction, granting a settlement, awarding fees, or crafting a remedy) without stating whether Section 2 was actually violated. Of the 160 published lawsuits decided in covered jurisdictions, sixty-eight
(42.5%) resulted in plaintiff success, compared with fifty-five (32.2%) of 171 lawsuits
published in noncovered jurisdictions. Id.
20
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986) (the minority group must demonstrate, first, that it is “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district;” second, that it is “politically cohesive;” and, third,
that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special
circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the
minority’s preferred candidate”).
21
Successful plaintiff outcomes comprise twenty-eight (93.3%) of the thirty such
lawsuits that satisfied Gingles in covered jurisdictions, while amounting to twenty-nine
(76.3%) of the thirty-eight such cases in noncovered ones. See VRI Database Master List,
supra note 13. This difference is statistically significant at the 90% level (p = 0.058).
22
See Appendix, Table 8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13. Challenges to local practices, i.e., those of a county, city, town, or school board, comprise 235
(or 71%) of the total reported Section 2 lawsuits, with 122 of 160 such lawsuits (or
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Electoral practices implemented by counties in covered jurisdictions have
been most vulnerable to challenge under Section 2, with plaintiffs obtaining favorable outcomes in 55.3% of the suits against county practices since 1982. Practices
adopted by schools and by states as a whole, in covered and noncovered jurisdictions alike, have been more resilient, with plaintiffs succeeding in 28.6% of the
lawsuits brought against these entities. Electoral practices adopted by cities and
towns have been more vulnerable in covered than in noncovered jurisdictions,
with more plaintiffs prevailing in covered jurisdictions and in a greater proportion
of the cases decided in these regions than in noncovered jurisdictions, although
this difference is not statistically significant.23
Changes vs. Longstanding Practices

Section 2 challenges to electoral changes in covered jurisdictions overwhelmingly address changes that have been precleared, given that Section 5 requires
these jurisdictions to obtain preclearance for such changes. As a result, successful
Section 2 challenges to these precleared practices constitute one area where Sections 2 and 5 do not overlap.24 To obtain preclearance, covered jurisdictions must
demonstrate that electoral changes are discriminatory neither in purpose nor in
effect, a standard the Supreme Court has interpreted to require a showing that the
changes do not worsen, or cause retrogression to, existing opportunities for political participation by minority voters.25 An electoral change might not make things
worse for minority voters when measured under Section 5’s retrogression standard
but might still be discriminatory in result within the meaning of Section 2.26
More plaintiffs challenged newly enacted or changed (as opposed to longstanding) electoral practices in noncovered jurisdictions than in covered ones.27 In

76.3%) originating in covered jurisdictions, and 113 of 171 (or 66%) from noncovered
ones. Id.
23
See Appendix, Table 8.3; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions succeeded in 46.3% of county challenges (twenty-five
of fifty-four of such challenges in this region) compared to 36.4%, or twenty of fifty-five,
such challenges in noncovered jurisdictions. Id.
24
For examples, see, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341 (4th
Cir. 2004); Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990); see also Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La. 1983) (citing case study of preclearance process
and later Section 2 challenge outlined in SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN AND
RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF DEMOCRACY 642–71 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter LAW OF
DEMOCRACY]).
25
See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (Bossier Parish
II); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
26
See, e.g., Warren v. City of Tampa, 693 F. Supp. 1051, 1053–54 (M.D. Fla. 1988),
aff’d Warren v. City of Tampa, 893 F.2d 347 (11th Cir. 1989) (regarding replacement of
at-large system with mixed system of at-large and district seats precleared then revised in
settlement following Section 2 challenge).
27
Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions challenged such changes in ninety-two
(53.8%) lawsuits. In covered jurisdictions, seventy-four (46.3%) of the Section 2 lawsuits
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both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, postcensus reapportionment plans28
account for the majority of the electoral changes challenged under Section 2. In
covered jurisdictions, however, more plaintiffs prevailed in these challenges and
did so in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the challenges brought.29
Within covered jurisdictions, challenges to postcensus reapportionment plans
were more successful than challenges to other types of electoral changes.30 The
opposite trend occurred in noncovered jurisdictions, with plaintiffs more frequently obtaining favorable outcomes in challenges to changes other than those
involving postcensus reapportionment plans.31 Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions succeeded in 36.7% of lawsuits challenging these other electoral changes,
while plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions succeeded in 28% of these suits.
Challenged Practices

Challenges to at-large elections comprise 146 of the 331 lawsuits examined,
making at-large elections the electoral practice most often subject to challenge
in published Section 2 lawsuits. More courts have struck down at-large elections
and have done so in a greater proportion of the lawsuits decided in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, although the difference between covered
and noncovered jurisdictions on this point is not statistically significant.32

challenged electoral changes. See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master
List, supra note 13.
28
As used here, postcensus reapportionment plans refer to mandatory redistricting
plans enacted every decade to comply with the one-person, one-vote mandate, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and are distinct from voluntary decisions to alter the
structure of a districting system by, for instance, moving from single-member districts to
at-large elections, from at-large to single-member districts, or from either regime to a
plan including some combination of single-member and at-large seats. These latter sort of
districting changes are counted in the “other electoral changes” category.
29
See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions won twenty-seven (55.1%) of the forty-nine challenges
they brought against reapportionment plans. Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions won
nineteen (30.6%) of the sixty-two such challenges they brought against these plans. Id.
30
Plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions obtained favorable outcomes, as described, id.,
in 55.1% of the challenges they brought to postcensus reapportionment plans, compared
to the lower success rate of 28% (seven of twenty-five) of the challenges they brought to
other types of electoral changes. See Appendix, Table 8.6; see also VRI Database Master
List, supra note 13.
31
These changes include challenges to the replacement of single-member with atlarge districts, the adoption of new residency requirements, and the institution of majority
vote requirements. Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions obtained favorable outcomes in
eleven of the thirty (36.7%) challenges they brought to such changes. This success rate is
greater than the 30.6% success rate plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions achieved when
they challenged such reapportionment plans. See supra note 29; see also Appendix, Table
8.4; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
32
See Appendix, Table 8.4 (showing that at-large challenges constitute 47.8% of
covered suits and 40.6% of noncovered suits, with a success rate of 50.6% for plaintiffs
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In covered jurisdictions, challenges to at-large elections have declined in the
years since 1982, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the lawsuits
decided. In noncovered jurisdictions, at-large challenges have steadily declined as
a proportion of the lawsuits decided, although plaintiffs brought more of these
types of challenges in absolute numbers during the 1990s than they did during the
1980s.33
A total of 111 Section 2 lawsuits challenged postcensus reapportionment
plans. Of these, forty-six ended with a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs. More
plaintiffs challenged reapportionment plans in noncovered jurisdictions than in
covered ones, but plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions prevailed in a statistically significantly greater proportion of such suits. In both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, Section 2 challenges to reapportionment plans have steadily increased as
a proportion of lawsuits brought, with a greater increase occurring in noncovered
jurisdictions.34
Forty-one lawsuits challenged election administration procedures such as requirements for registration, voting, or candidacy, or polling place rules or practices. Fourteen of these suits ended with a favorable outcome for the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs in noncovered jurisdictions challenged roughly the same number of election procedures as did plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions, but prevailed in a greater
proportion of these lawsuits, albeit one that is not statistically significant.35
Thirteen lawsuits challenged majority-vote requirements such as a run-off requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or numbered-place systems. Plaintiffs in
covered jurisdictions brought ten of these challenges and prevailed in five of them.
Plaintiffs prevailed in one of the three majority-vote challenges brought in noncovered jurisdictions.36
Thirty-nine Section 2 lawsuits addressed annexations, felon disfranchisement
provisions, and appointment practices, and none of these ended with a favorable
outcome for the plaintiffs. Seventeen of the lawsuits originated in covered jurisdictions, while twenty-two originated in noncovered.37
in covered jurisdictions, compared to a success rate of 40.6% in noncovered); see also
Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56.
33
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 656; see also VRI
Database Master List, supra note 13.
34
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 656; see also Appendix, Table 8.4 (showing reapportionment challenge success rate of 55.1% in covered
jurisdictions and 30.6% in noncovered); VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that in covered jurisdictions, reapportionment plan challenges have gone from 27% of
suits in the 1980s and 1990s, to 41.9% in the 2000s, and that in noncovered juisdictions,
these suits have increased from 14.6% in the 1980s, to 39.3% in the 1990s, and 51.5% in
the 2000s).
35
See Appendix, Table 8.4 (showing that twenty suits in covered jurisdictions challenged election administration procedures, with 25% of them succeeding, compared to
twenty-one such suits in noncovered jurisdictions, which had a 42.9% success rate); see
also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
36
Id.; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
37
Id.
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B. The Senate Factors
More courts found Senate Factors 1 (history of official discrimination in voting), 3 (enhancing practices), and 7 (lack of minority candidate success) in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. Courts in covered jurisdictions, moreover, found these factors in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the
lawsuits in which they addressed the Senate Factors than did courts in noncovered
jurisdictions. Courts in covered jurisdictions have found factors 5 (socio-economic
discrimination hindering present opportunities for political participation), 6 (racial
appeals), and 9 (tenuous justification for challenged policy) in a greater number
and proportion of cases than have courts in noncovered jurisdictions, although the
differences on these factors are not statistically significant. Courts in covered and
noncovered jurisdictions have found Senate Factors 2 (racial bloc voting), 4 (inaccessible slating process), and 8 (lack of responsiveness) in roughly equal numbers
and proportions. Courts in covered jurisdictions making Factor 2 findings, though,
documented elections showing more extreme racially polarized voting patterns
than did courts in noncovered jurisdictions, a difference that is statistically significant.38
Some Senate Factors have figured more prominently in Section 2 lawsuits
than others. Racial bloc voting has consistently been the factor on which Section 2
liability most depends, with 105 judicial findings of racial bloc voting overall and
62.6% of all favorable plaintiff outcomes including such a finding. Courts have
also consistently found a history of discrimination (111 findings, found in 56.1%
of successful suits), a lack of minority electoral success (90 findings, found in
53.7% of successful suits), and socio-economic discrimination (88 findings, found
in 47.2% of successful suits). Fewer courts adjudicating Section 2 lawsuits have
found enhancing practices (52 findings, found in 29.3% of successful suits), racial
appeals (33 findings, found in 16.3% of successful suits), a tenuous policy underlying the challenged policy (23 findings, found in 17.9% of successful suits), unresponsive elected officials (20 findings, found in 12.2% of successful suits), and a
discriminatory slating process (10 findings, found in 7.3% of successful suits).
Some factors correlated more strongly with plaintiff success than others.
Plaintiffs achieved a favorable result in 95.7% of the lawsuits that found a tenuous
policy (Factor 9), 90% of those that identified a discriminatory slating process
(Factor 4), 75% of the lawsuits that found nonresponsiveness (Factor 8), 73.3% of
those that identified a lack of minority candidate success (Factor 7), 73.3% of
those that found legally significant racial bloc voting (Factor 2), 69.2% of those
38

This section compares Section 2 lawsuits that found a specific Senate factor to the
total number of lawsuits that considered the Senate factors in each type of jurisdiction.
Not every lawsuit identified included a published discussion of these factors, either because they did not need to reach the merits of the case or because the only published
opinion documents a stage of the case, such as a settlement or remedy, when factor findings are rarely necessary. In covered jurisdictions, courts in 105 lawsuits published factor
analyses, while 131 did so in noncovered jurisdictions. See Appendix, Table 8.2; see also
VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
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that identified use of an enhancing practice (Factor 3), 65.9% of those that found
ongoing socio-economic discrimination (Factor 5), 62.2% of those that found a
history of discrimination affecting the right to vote (Factor 1), and 60.6% of those
finding racial campaign appeals (Factor 6).
Extent of Official Discrimination in Voting

The first factor listed in the Senate Report asks courts to assess “the extent
of any history of official discrimination” in the jurisdiction that “touched the
right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to
participate in the democratic process.”39 More courts found Factor 1 in covered
jurisdictions, and did so in a statistically significantly greater proportion of the
lawsuits in which they engaged in factor analysis, than did courts in noncovered
jurisdictions.40
Thirty-three lawsuits—10% of the lawsuits suits decided—identified more
than 100 instances of intentional, official discriminatory conduct in voting since
1982. More courts identified instances of such conduct and did so in a greater proportion of the lawsuits they decided in noncovered jurisdictions than in covered
ones,41 although this difference is not statistically significant.
These findings describe a wide range of conduct by public officials. In covered and noncovered jurisdictions alike, Factor 1 findings suggest that local officials more frequently engaged in intentional discriminatory conduct than did
state officials and more frequently did so in the course of making new policies
than when implementing existing ones.42

39

SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.
Covered jurisdiction lawsuits found this factor sixty-one times, or in 58.1% of the
lawsuits to address the factors. Noncovered jurisdiction lawsuits found this factor fifty
times, amounting to 38.2% of the relevant lawsuits. See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing
findings of the suits considering Senate factors); see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
These findings are unsurprising given that the coverage formula for targeted jurisdictions is based on criteria Congress thought would capture regions that had just this
history. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 115 (calling the trigger formula in section
4 of the VRA “designed to identify jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination”);
see also id. at 5 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965)) (quoting Senator Javits on the purpose of the act as aiming, “not only to correct an active history of discrimination, the
denying to [minorities] of the right to register and vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination . . . the bill would attempt to do something about accumulated
wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs”); see also Senate Reauthorization Hearings,
supra note 4 (May 16, 2006) (statement by Karlan).
41
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 657 and n. 51 (listing judicial findings); see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that
twelve (7.5%) of total covered suits found evidence of post-1982 intentional discrimination or a constitutional violation, compared with twenty-one such findings, amounting to
12%, of the noncovered lawsuits).
42
Id. at 675–95.
40
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Courts in an additional thirty lawsuits documented a history of official discrimination but either discounted the finding or concluded that such discrimination
no longer affected contemporary voting rights. More courts made this finding in
noncovered jurisdictions than covered jurisdictions.43
Racial Bloc Voting

Racial polarization in voting, also known as racial bloc voting, factors into
the evaluation of Section 2 claims at two junctures. The second and third of the
so-called Gingles preconditions instruct courts to determine whether minority
voters are politically cohesive and whether white voters vote sufficiently as a
bloc to defeat the minority-preferred candidate.44 Courts who so find (and also
find the first Gingles factor45) must then evaluate whether the plaintiffs can sustain their claim under “the totality of circumstances.”46 This inquiry includes
analysis of Senate Factor 2, which calls for assessment of “the extent to which
voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.”47
In practice, however, courts that consider racial bloc voting since 1986 generally engage in one inquiry, typically under the Gingles factors.48 Of those that
deem Gingles satisfied and proceed to the totality of circumstances review, some
simply refer back to their previous analysis of racial bloc voting under Gingles.
Other courts engage in additional analysis, typically examining within the totality
of circumstances the question whether race is the cause of the polarized voting
patterns identified under Gingles.49
Of the 236 lawsuits that considered the Senate Factors, 105 (44.5%) found legally significant racial bloc voting. Courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions
43

See id. at 676 and n.173, 695–97 (showing that twelve (16.4%) of the seventythree courts documenting official discrimination in covered jurisdictions decided that
such discrimination no longer affected the right to vote, compared with eighteen (26.5%)
of the sixty-eight courts finding official discrimination in noncovered jurisdictions).
44
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
45
Id. at 50 (plaintiffs must show that the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district).
46
See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994).
47
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30; see also BERNARD GROFMAN, L.
HANDLEY AND R. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 82–103 (1992) (describing the various tests and approaches expert witnesses have
used in Section 2 cases to define and measure racially polarized voting).
48
Decisions announced between the 1982 Amendments and the Court’s decision in
Gingles obviously do not employ the Gingles test. Instead, these courts applied varied
standards to evaluate racial bloc voting under Senate Factor 2. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at Part II.B.2.
49
See, e.g., United States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277–78
(D.S.C. 2003); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1116
(5th Cir. 1991); Gunn v. Chickasaw County, No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL
33426761, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997) (Chickasaw County II); United States v.
Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1029–33 (D. Colo. 2004); Lewis v. Alamance
County, 99 F.3d 600, 604 (4th Cir. 1996).
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alike found the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting in roughly the
same number of lawsuits, with courts in covered jurisdictions making this finding
in a greater, albeit not demonstrably statistically significant, proportion of the lawsuits in which they considered the Senate Factors.50 More courts finding legally
significant racially polarized voting produced an outcome favorable to the plaintiffs in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. They also did so in a greater
proportion of the lawsuits in which they considered the Senate Factors, although
this difference is not statistically significant.51
When assessing racial bloc voting, courts have recorded election results from
hundreds of state and local elections.52 Of the cases in which courts found legally
significant racial bloc voting, courts in covered jurisdictions have documented
racial polarization in specific elections that was more extreme than have courts in
noncovered ones, and have done so at rates that are statistically significant. Of the
specific minority versus white elections documented in covered jurisdictions,53
50
See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing fifty-two findings in covered jurisdictions and
fifty-three in noncovered, which represents 49.5% of covered suits and 40.5% of noncovered suits considering Senate factors); see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
51
See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that, of the suits finding
racially polarized voting in each type of jurisdiction, forty-one (78.8%) reached a favorable outcome in covered, compared to thrity-six (or 67.9%) in noncovered suits).
52
Courts provided information regarding the size of the white voting bloc in 202
elections in covered jurisdictions and 257 elections in noncovered ones, sometimes including averages representing multiple elections. See Appendix, Table 8.5. The numbers
included here were derived from the election data provided by courts in the 105 Section 2
lawsuits that found legally significant racial bloc voting. The analysis relies on the numbers courts most often provided, namely, details about either the number of white voters
only voting for white candidates or the number or percentage of white voters who supported the minority candidate. Courts rarely provided a single level of overall polarization, opting instead to describe the levels in specific elections. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish, 2002 WL 2022589, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2002) (noting that, in the 1999 election
for St. Bernard Parish Council, a black candidate received 5% of the white vote). When
courts cited an average level of polarization for a series of elections, that average was
counted for the total number of elections it represents, if that number was provided, or
once if the court gave the average without providing the total number of elections. This
analysis excludes examples in covered and noncovered jurisdictions that were difficult to
compare consistently with other lawsuits. See, e.g., Windy Boy v. County of Big Horn,
647 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (D. Mont. 1986) (discussing data for 241 election contests from
1978–1984 in a noncovered county of 12,671 people that showed average levels of white
bloc voting of 86–96%). The analysis also could not include numbers where courts did
not provide them. See, e.g., Gunn v. Chickasaw County II, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22087,
at *4 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (“as a general rule, whites in Chickasaw County vote for white
candidates and blacks vote for black candidates”).
53
See Appendix, Table 8.5; see also Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra
note 13, at Part II.C.2; id. app., tbl., White Bloc Voting Levels Documented in Section 2
Litigation, 1982–2005: Elections and Citations, at http://www.votingreport.org. Courts
disagree about the probative value of elections involving only white candidates for purposes of the racial bloc voting inquiry, and many lawsuits provided no details about such
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80.7% involved white bloc voting rising to at least 80%, meaning that 80% or
more of white voters voted exclusively for white candidates in these elections. In
noncovered jurisdictions, by contrast, 40.9% of the elections documented involved
white vote polarization of 80% or higher. 54
In both covered and noncovered jurisdictions, the total number of findings of
racially polarized voting has declined from the 1980s to the 2000s. Findings of
legally significant racially polarized voting have declined in covered jurisdictions
from thirty lawsuits in the 1980s, to sixteen in the 1990s, and to six since 2000. In
comparison, findings in noncovered jurisdictions ranged from fifteen in the 1980s,
to twenty-eight in the 1990s, and to ten in the 2000s.55
Use of Enhancing Practices: At-large Elections, Majority Vote Requirements

Senate Factor 3 inquires about the “extent to which the state or political
subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority-vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group.”56
Courts in fifty-two lawsuits documented the use of at least one of these practices, with courts in covered jurisdictions being more than twice as likely as
courts in noncovered jurisdictions to make such a finding.57 This difference is
statistically significant. Courts in covered jurisdictions have nevertheless found
Factor 3 less often over time.58
Thirty-four lawsuits found majority-vote requirements, with 79% (all but
seven) of these originating in covered jurisdictions. Twenty-six found anti-single
elections. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at Part II.B.2. As a
result, the analysis here includes data from only those elections involving a minority candidate where this was clear in the judicial opinion.
54
See Appendix, Table 8.5.
55
See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13.
56
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30. Single shot voting is a practice by
which voters can direct their votes to a single candidate running in a multimember district
and choose not to cast their remaining votes for other candidates running at the same
time. Doing so increases the relative weight of their votes by reducing the number of
votes other candidates receive. An anti-single shot provision may prevent voters from
doing this, typically by disqualifying any ballot where a voter has not used all available
votes. See QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 3, at 46 (explaining the numbered place ballot
system, a common type of anti-single shot provision: “[s]ingle shot voting is impossible
if each candidate is required to qualify for a separate place or post (i.e., place no. 1, place
no. 2, and so forth). Because every seat on the governing body is filled through a head-tohead contest in which only one vote can be cast, there is no way to increase the mathematical weight of one’s ballot by denying votes to other candidates.”).
57
See Appendix, Table 8.2; see also VRI Database Master List and Katz et al.,
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 698.
58
See VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (findings of Factor 3 in covered jurisdictions have declined as follows: eighteen in the 1980s, eleven in the 1990s, and four
in the 2000s; compared, in noncovered jurisdictions, to the following: eight in the 1980s,
ten in the 1990s, and one in the 2000s).
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shot provisions, such as staggered terms and/or numbered-place requirements,
with thirteen (50%) originating in covered jurisdictions. In roughly equal proportions, courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions found the use of an unusually
large district, with five of the eleven findings coming from covered jurisdictions.
Six courts, equally divided between covered and noncovered jurisdictions, found
other enhancing practices, including the use of an automatic voter removal or
“purge” law (based upon voting frequency), a short interval between an initial
election and the runoff election, candidate registration fee, candidate residency
requirement, or low financial compensation for elected officials.59
At-large elections were challenged in 146 lawsuits, but courts based a Factor
3 finding on their use in only thirteen lawsuits. Ten of these suits involved challenges to the at-large election itself, while the remaining three involved other practices.60 This highlights the trend among courts to invoke and find Factor 3 only
when identifying practices other than the one challenged in the lawsuit, namely
ones that “enhanced” the discriminatory results of the practice challenged.
Candidate Slating

Factor 4 asks whether members of the minority group have been denied access to a candidate slating process if such a process exists in the jurisdiction.61
While the Senate Report does not define the term discriminatory “slating,” the
Fifth Circuit has described it as “a process in which some influential nongovernmental organization selects and endorses a group or ‘slate’ of candidates,
rendering the election little more than a stamp of approval for the candidates
selected.”62 Courts adjudicating Section 2 claims have rarely found slating, identifying a total of thirteen instances of slating or slating-like conduct, four of
which originated in covered jurisdictions.63
Eight instances of discriminatory slating involved political parties or their officers, seven of which originated in noncovered jurisdictions.64 Courts cited the
59

See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 698.
Id.; Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (election procedures); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D. 2004) (redistricting); Jeffers v.
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (redistricting).
61
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.
62
Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1116
n.5 (5th Cir. 1991).
63
See Appendix, Table 8.2. Courts in ten lawsuits expressly found the existence of a
discriminatory slating process while courts in another three cases identified practices that
sound in slating but discussed them in the context of another factor such as history of
discrimination or racial appeals, see Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note
13, at 699; the four covered instances occur in: Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp.
749, 777 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th
Cir. 1987); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1037 (D.S.D. 2004); Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1196, 1223–24 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
64
Noncovered: Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Coalition For Fair Representation, 26 F.3d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1994); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1030-31 (C.D.
Ill. 1987); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany,
60
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failure of political parties to slate or endorse minority candidates, the decision to
support minority candidates only when they ran from majority-minority districts,
the exclusion of “endorsed” minority candidates from party-prepared campaign
materials, and the express opposition to minority candidates by party officials who
actively campaigned against them.65
Three lawsuits, two of which originated in covered jurisdictions, document
slating by private organizations, finding that electoral success hinged on the financial and endorsement support of certain private groups, which had rarely or never
supported minority candidates.66 In contrast, the noncovered Marylanders litigation identified slating by state-funded, all-white fire departments on the Eastern
Shore of Maryland.67 Finally, the 1997 City of LaGrange lawsuit from the covered
state of Georgia inferred the existence of a discriminatory slating process because
the absence of minority candidates “suggests a lack of opportunity, rather than a
lack of inclination.”68
Ongoing Effects of Discrimination (Education, Employment, Health)

The fifth Senate Factor calls for evaluation of “the extent to which members
of the minority group bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process.”69 A roughly equal number of courts that engaged in
2003 WL 21524820, at *12 (July 7, N.D.N.Y. 2003); New Rochelle Voter Defense Fund
v. City of New Rochelle, 308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Goosby v. Town of
Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 483-86, 494 (2d Cir. 1999); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Comm’rs Voter Registration Div., 824 F. Supp. 514, 537 & n.22 (1993);
Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1991). Covered: Shirt, 336 F.
Supp. 2d at 1036.
65
See, e.g., County of Albany, 2003 WL 21524820, at *12 (“minorities have generally been excluded from candidacy for County offices except in majority/minority districts”); City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d at 276 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that a black candidate
won the mayoral primary, that an influential group called the Democratic Town Committee failed to endorse him, and that the candidate lost the general election in an overwhelmingly Democratic city); Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1037 (“[T]he chairman of the
Democratic central committee in Bennett County actively campaigned against his own
party’s nominees for county commissioner in the 2002 general elections after Indian candidates unseated the incumbent, non-Indian Democrats in the primary election.”); Armour, 775 F. Supp at 1056 (noting that an officially endorsed African-American candidate received zero votes in several precincts despite the fact that party rules required
party officials, two of whom resided in such precincts, to support the party’s nominee);
City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. at 537 and n.22 (campaign materials distributed by the
Democratic Party included all candidates running at-large for city council except one
Latino and one African American).
66
Covered: Gretna, 834 F.2d at 499; Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. at
1223-24. Noncovered: City of Chicago Heights, 1997 WL 102543, at *9.
67
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1061
(D. Md. 1994).
68
City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. at 777.
69
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.

200

Ellen Katz

factor analysis found this factor in covered and noncovered jurisdictions, but
they did so in a greater proportion of the covered lawsuits than in noncovered
ones. The difference in proportion suggests a relationship but does not rise to
conventional levels of statistical significance.70
Many courts relied on voter registration rates as one way to gauge the minority group’s “ability to participate effectively in the political process.” Fourteen
lawsuits in covered jurisdictions document minority voter registration rates that
lag behind the white voter registration rate, compared with three such lawsuits in
noncovered jurisdictions. Nine of the lawsuits from covered jurisdictions date
from the 1980s, including one that found African-American voter registration in
Mississippi in 1985 lagged twenty-five percentage points below that of whites.71
The post-1990 findings report minority registration rates in covered jurisdictions
that range from 9 to 32.1 points below that of whites.72
Courts also evaluated levels of minority-voter turnout as a measure of effective political participation. Thirteen lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions identified
lower rates of minority-voter turnout, notwithstanding equivalent voter registration
rates.73 Five lawsuits in covered jurisdictions found lower turnout alone,74 while
four additional lawsuits in covered jurisdictions expressly found both that the minority-voter registration rate and minority-voter turnout rate lagged behind that of
whites.75 Nearly equivalent levels of minority turnout or registration led courts in
both covered and noncovered jurisdictions to conclude in roughly equal numbers
that Factor 5 was not met.76
Some courts looked beyond quantitative comparisons to consider how various
forms of racial segregation affected the ability of minority groups to participate in
the political process. Five of the six lawsuits to consider the effects of ongoing
70
See Appendix, Table 8.2; Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13,
at 702; see also VRI Database Master List, supra note 13 (showing that courts found
Factor 5 in 42.9% of covered suits considering Senate factors, compared to 32.8% of
such noncovered suits).
71
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 704–05; Mississippi State Chapter, Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1991).
72
Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1371 (11th Cir. 1997) (12.85-point
black/white disparity in 1995); Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 294 (5th Cir. 1996)
(19.8-point black/white registration gap as of 1996); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d
976, 1039-40 (D.S.D. 2004) (20-point Indian/white disparity in 2000); City of La Grange,
969 F. Supp. at 768 (32.1-point and 9-point black/white gaps in 1991 and 1995).
73
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 704.
74
U.S. v. Charleston County, 365 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2004); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D. La. 1986); Jackson v. Edgefield County, 650 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D.S.C. 1986); Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 599
F. Supp. 397, 401 (N.D. Miss 1984); United States v. Dallas County Comm’n, 739 F.2d
1529, 1538 (11th Cir. 1984).
75
Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1039–40; Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1428
(E.D. Va. 1988); McDaniels v. Mehfoud, 702 F. Supp. 588, 594 (E.D. Va. 1988); Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
76
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 705 and n. 345.
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segregation probative of the Factor 5 inquiry originated in covered jurisdictions.77
The district court in the Charleston County litigation observed severe societal and
housing segregation and found that racial separation “makes it especially difficult
for African-American candidates seeking countywide office to reach out to and
communicate with the predominantly white electorate from whom they must obtain substantial support to win an at-large election[.]”78 The district court in the
Neal litigation concluded that similar segregation means “that whites in the
County have historically had little personal knowledge of or social contact with
blacks. . . . Quite simply, whites do not know blacks and are, as a result highly
unlikely to vote for black candidates.”79
Racial Appeals

The sixth factor in the Senate Report instructs courts to assess whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.80 In covered jurisdictions, 18 courts, comprising 17.1% of the lawsuits that considered the
Senate Factors, found this factor, compared with fifteen findings (or 11.5%) in
noncovered jurisdictions.81 These differences are not statistically significant.
Some courts noted that campaigns generally have been marked by racial appeals,82 but most decisions finding Factor 6 identified appeals in specific campaigns. Courts have identified racial appeals in seventy-three specific elections
occurring between 1950 and 2002, with forty-three of these appeals occurring in
covered jurisdictions. Courts finding Factor 6 identified forty-seven specific racial
appeals or campaigns characterized by racial appeals since 1982, thirty (63.8%) of
which occurred in covered jurisdictions.83
Section 2 lawsuits have construed a range of conduct to constitute a racial
appeal. In covered and noncovered communities alike, racial appeals included
advertisements with photographs that darkened the skin of minority candidates,
efforts to link candidates with racially divisive figures, and the invocation of
racially inflammatory issues and rhetoric in campaigns.84

77
Id. at 706 (covered cases); Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F.3d 1015, 1023
(8th Cir. 1997) (noncovered).
78
Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 291.
79
Neal, 689 F. Supp. at 1430.
80
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.
81
See Appendix, Table 8.2; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al.,
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 708; id. at 771–72, app., tbl. C, Racial
Appeals Documented in Section 2 Litigation: Timeline and Citations, http://www.votingreport.org.
82
See, e.g., Ward v. Columbus County, 782 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (E.D.N.C. 1991)
(noting the long history and continuing practice of using racial appeals in campaigns in
Columbus County and North Carolina generally).
83
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 708.
84
Id. at 708–17.
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Lack of Minority Electoral Success

Under Senate Factor 7, courts are instructed to evaluate the “extent to which
members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.”85 Courts examining the Senate Factors were more likely to find a lack of
minority electoral success in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, and
did so at a rate that is statistically significant. Nearly one in two courts in covered jurisdictions found a lack of candidate success, compared to less than one
in three courts in noncovered jurisdictions.86
Courts evaluating Factor 7 looked primarily at election results, counting the
number of minority candidates elected, typically over the course of several elections and even decades.87 Several cases distinguished election results occurring
before the lawsuit was initiated and those filed afterwards and often discounted
evidence of postfiling minority success as strategic efforts to frustrate the lawsuit.88
Unsurprisingly, Factor 7 weighed heavily in the plaintiffs’ favor in cases
where electoral results revealed a total absence or dearth of minority candidates
winning election. Courts have repeatedly found a lack of minority success in this
situation. In covered jurisdictions, twenty-four lawsuits challenging thirty-two
governing bodies specifically found that no minority candidate had ever been
elected in the post-1964 era. Fourteen lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions challenging seventeen governing bodies made the same finding.89
On the other hand, Factor 7 favored defendants where electoral results
showed significant success of minority candidates. In twenty-two lawsuits, courts
in noncovered areas found significant and sustained electoral success in the defendant jurisdictions. Eight courts in covered jurisdictions made the same finding.90
Electoral results do not constitute the entire inquiry under Factor 7. Numerous
courts have considered the record of minority electoral success in conjunction with
population statistics. While Section 2 is explicit that the statute provides no right to
proportional representation,91 several courts viewed the absence of proportional
85

SENATE REPORT, supra note 12 at 27–30.
See Appendix, Table 8.2 (showing that of covered suits considering Senate Factors, 48.6% found a lack of minority candidate success, compared to 29.8% of such noncovered suits; in absolute terms, fifty-one covered suits found a lack of success as compared to thirty-nine noncovered); VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al.,
Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 717–18.
87
See, e.g., Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1319 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that
no Hispanic candidate had won election to state legislature from the district since 1940).
88
See, e.g., Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1998); Gunn v.
Chickasaw County II, No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761, at *4 (N.D.
Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. 285, 299 (M.D. La. 1988); McNeil
v. City of Springfield, 658 F. Supp. 1015, 1031 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
89
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 718–19.
90
See id.
91
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2005) (providing that “nothing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population”).
86
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representation as suggesting a lack of minority electoral success under Factor 7.92
Others viewed evidence that minority officeholders approached or exceeded the
proportion of minorities in the electorate as proof of minority electoral success.93
Where minority electoral success hinges on the advantages of incumbency secured through appointment, some courts have found that such “success” has little
bearing on the ability of minority candidates to win elections generally.94 Others
have viewed such evidence as indicating minority electoral success is possible.95
Several lawsuits looked beyond electoral results to assess the number of minority candidates participating in given races. Some courts noted that the failure of
minority citizens to “offer themselves” as candidates weighed against finding a
lack of minority electoral success.96 Other courts, however, considered the possibility that a dearth of minority candidates might itself stem from “the very barriers
to political participation that Congress has sought to remove” and weighed the
small number of minority candidates in favor of plaintiffs.97
Lack of Responsiveness

In addition to the seven “typical” factors listed above, the Senate Report
adds two additional factors “that in some cases have had probative value” in
establishing a Section 2 violation. The first, called here Factor 8, is whether
there “is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to
the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.”98 Few courts
have found a lack of responsiveness, with twenty findings in 331 lawsuits.
Courts in covered and noncovered jurisdictions found this factor in equal numbers and similar proportions.99
Courts have more frequently found a lack of responsiveness when elected officials engaged in acts of official discrimination in covered jurisdictions.100 Non92

See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 719 and n. 441.
See id. at 720 and n. 442.
94
See id. at 720 and nn. 450–51.
95
See NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1021 (2d Cir. 1995); Askew
v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d 1355, 1384 n.18 (11th Cir. 1997).
96
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Red Clay Sch. Dist., 780 F. Supp. 221, 226 (D. Del. 1991);
McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1984).
97
See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1397–98 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208
n. 9 (5th Cir. 1989)); see also Cofield v. City of LaGrange, 969 F. Supp. 749, 776 (N.D.
Ga. 1997); LULAC v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 604 (W.D. Tex.
1986); Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 833 (6th Cir. 1998).
98
SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 29.
99
See Appendix, Table 8.2; VRI Database Master List, supra note 13; See Katz et
al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 722.
100
In eight cases where a court either made findings of post-1982 official discrimination or actually held that the jurisdiction had engaged in intentional discrimination in
violation of the statute or Constitution, courts also found a lack of responsiveness—with
six of these in covered jurisdictions. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Education, 686 F.
Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Brown v. Board of School Comm’rs, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th
93
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discrimination sufficed to establish responsiveness in a number of lawsuits, but not
all of them.101 Many courts looked for additional efforts on behalf of minority constituents, ranging from the provision of services such as road paving, medical care,
community policing, the creation of affirmative action hiring plans and staff training, or funding for community development.102
Several courts defined responsiveness in procedural terms, examining the extent to which elected officials met with minority constituents, knew their concerns,
campaigned in their neighborhoods, and otherwise encouraged minority political
participation.103
Tenuousness

The second additional factor the Senate Report lists for consideration, called
here Factor 9, is “whether the justification for the policy behind the practice is
tenuous.”104 Courts in both covered and noncovered jurisdictions held the identified justification to be tenuous infrequently, in roughly equal numbers but in a
greater proportion of the covered lawsuits to engage in factor analysis than in noncovered ones. The difference in proportion suggests a relationship but does not rise
to conventional levels of statistical significance.105 Twelve lawsuits addressed
tenuousness in cases where defendants offered no justification for the challenged
policy, of which two-thirds are from covered jurisdictions.106

II. The Need for a Record, But of What Type?
Congress approved reauthorization of Section 5 last summer, and President
Bush promptly signed the legislation. The question that remains is whether the
Supreme Court will let it stand. The Court has explicitly upheld Section 5’s validity in the past107 and specifically affirmed its continued constitutionality even
Cir. 1983); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections of
State of Ill., 574 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Armour v. Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044
(N.D. Ohio 1991); Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D.S.D 2004); Williams v.
City of Dallas, 734 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Political Civil Voters Organization
v. Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
101
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 723 and n. 470;
id. at 724.
102
Id. at 724–25 and nn. 474–86.
103
Id. at 725–27.
104
SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–30.
105
See Appendix, Figure 8.2 (showing that 12.4% of covered suits considering factors, compared to 7.6% of noncovered suits, found a tenuous justification); VRI Database
Master List, supra note 13; Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at
727.
106
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 727–28.
107
See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 284–85 (1999); City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
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as the justices have articulated new, stringent limitations on congressional power
to enforce civil rights in other contexts.108 Nevertheless, the Court’s willingness
to uphold Section 5 as reauthorized remains far from certain.
The reason stems largely from a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning
in 1997. City of Boerne v. Flores announced the now familiar requirement that
congressional legislation enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments must exhibit
“congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
and the means adopted to that end.”109 The Court invalidated six federal statutes
under this standard, specifically judging the congressional findings underlying
each statute insufficient to justify the statutory proscriptions involved.110 The
Court’s two most recent Boerne decisions uphold congressional enactments based
on thinner records than those deemed inadequate in the original decisions,111 but
they nevertheless continue to emphasize “the extent and specificity” of the unconstitutional state conduct needed as a predicate for congressional action.112 Read
108
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88–89 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 639 and n.5 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
518 (1997); see also Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–38
(2003); id. at 742–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 547–48
(2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See generally Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the
Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2368 n. 157 (2003).
109
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
110
See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Title I of
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Florida Prepaid II) (Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Florida Prepaid I)
(Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
111
Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520–22 (2004), upheld the Family Medical Leave Act and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, respectively. These decisions may signal
the Court’s greater deference to Congress when challenged statutes implicate a suspect
classification or fundamental right. See Erwin Chemerinsky, New Federalism: Real Discrimination?, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 97, 118 (2004) (“Together Lane and Hibbs establish that Congress has more authority to act under Section 5 . . . when it is dealing with
claims of discrimination or violations of rights which receive heightened scrutiny.”); but
see Vikram David Amar, The New “New Federalism”: The Supreme Court in Hibbs (and
Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2d 349, 351–54 (2003) (arguing that the heightened scrutiny for
gender classifications notwithstanding, Hibbs is irreconcilable with Boerne and Morrison).
112
See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733–34 and n.11 (2003); Lane, 541 U.S. at 528–29
(“sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of unconstitutional dis-
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together,113 the Boerne decisions suggest that Congress can rely on neither general
assertions nor isolated examples of unconstitutional conduct,114 but instead must
document a widespread pattern of such conduct by entities of the sort being subject to suit.115
Many people read Boerne and its progeny to signal that the reauthorization of
Section 5 will survive constitutional scrutiny only if the congressional record underlying the statute documents pervasive unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions.116 To the extent the Court will require such a record,117 the Section 2
decisions offer one source for identifying recent instances of unconstitutional conduct related to voting. While Section 2’s results-based test for discrimination in
voting prohibits conduct that would not necessarily violate the Constitution,118
eighteen Section 2 decisions, eight of which originated in covered jurisdictions,
identified unconstitutional conduct.119 As important, courts assessing the Senate
crimination” demonstrated through “judicial findings of unconstitutional state action, and
statistical, legislative, and anecdotal evidence of the widespread exclusion of persons
with disabilities from the enjoyment of public services”).
113
But cf. supra note 111.
114
See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (dismissing “unexamined, anecdotal accounts
of ‘adverse, disparate treatment by state officials,’” when found outside the formal legislative findings); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (2000) (rejecting as insufficient “assorted sentences . . . cobble[d] together from a decade’s worth of congressional reports and floor
debates” as either general unsubstantiated assertions or isolated anecdotal examples).
While the Court has not wholly rejected anecdotal evidence suggesting unconstitutional
conduct, it has treated such examples with considerable skepticism and indicated its preference for examples of adjudicated constitutional violations. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 375–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting absence of “confirming judicial documentation” in the form of court decisions addressing unconstitutional discrimination by States
against people with disabilities).
115
See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (finding that Congress failed “to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,” and that it lacked “evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States”); Florida Prepaid I, 527
U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (concluding that “Congress identified no pattern of such [patent]
infringement [by the States], let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.”); City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (noting absence of evidence documenting “some widespread
pattern of religious discrimination in this country”); id. at 526 (noting absence of a
“widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights”).
116
See, e.g., supra note 6; see also Richard L. Hasen, What Congress Should Consider Before Renewing the Voting Rights Act: A Chance to Preempt Supreme Court Invalidation, and Better Protect Minority Voting Rights, FindLaw (May 30, 2006)
(“[T]here is a very serious risk that the Roberts Court would strike down a renewed section 5 as unconstitutional.”), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20060530_
hasen.html.
117
For the argument why it should not, see infra notes 124–152 and accompanying
text.
118
See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
119
For lawsuits expressly finding both constitutional and Section 2 violations, see
Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918
F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Board of School Comm’rs, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir.
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factors in the course of adjudicating Section 2 cases have documented evidence
that reveals a wide range of unconstitutional conduct by state and local officials.
While these judicial findings are not formal adjudications of unconstitutional conduct, they represent the considered judgment of federal judges that the evidence
they reviewed in the course of litigation reveals conduct that runs afoul of the
Constitution.120
Standing alone, however, these findings do not appear to establish the sort of
record the Court has required in the Boerne decisions.121 While courts evaluating
Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions have documented pervasive, systematic
racial discrimination linked to voting in specific locations in recent years,122 courts
in noncovered regions have identified official conduct of a similar character.123 In
both regions, moreover, findings of unconstitutional conduct in specific Section 2
cases may in fact be relatively isolated examples of misconduct and not emblem1983); NAACP v. Gadsden County, 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1982); City of New Rochelle,
308 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.
Ark. 1990); Marks v. Stinson, 1994 WL 146113, at * 33–4 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Armour v.
Ohio, 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991); League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1986); Political Civil Voters
Org’n v. Terrell, 565 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see also Haywood County, 544 F.
Supp. 1122 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (preliminary injunction based on proven Section 2 violation and likely success on constitutional claim); Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I.
1982) (declaratory and injunctive relief based on “constitutional error” and implied Section 2 violation). For lawsuits finding discriminatory intent and effect under Section 2,
see Dillard v. Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Harris v.
Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 525 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Dillard v. Baldwin Bd. of Ed., 686
F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (M.D. Ala. 1988); Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1485 (M.D.
Ala. 1983); see also United States v. Town of Cicero, 2000 WL 34342276, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (preliminary injunction based on likely success on showing purposeful discrimination under Section 2); Dillard v. Crenshaw, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 1986)
(same).
120
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 675–97.
121
To the extent that Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane signal the Court’s greater deference to Congress in cases implicating a suspect classification or fundamental right, the
reauthorization of Section 5 may be less vulnerable than commonly believed with the
Section 2 findings providing a good portion of the record that is required. See supra note
111.
122
See, e.g., Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1024-28 (D.S.D. 2004); United
States v. Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286 n.23 (D.S.C. 2003); Hall v.
Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1570–71 (11th Cir. 1992); Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F.
Supp. 1317, 1324 (N.D. Tex. 1990); Town of North Johns, 717 F. Supp. 1471, 1477
(M.D. Ala. 1989); Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517, 527 and n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1988);
Harris v. Graddick, 593 F. Supp. 128, 133 (M.D. Ala. 1984); Dillard v. Crenshaw
County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356, 1360–61 (M.D. Ala. 1986).
123
See, e.g., United States v. Berks County, 250 F. Supp. 2d 525, 527 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Cuthair v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1162 (D. Colo.
1998); Stabler v. County of Thurston, 129 F. 3d 1015, 1022–23 (8th Cir. 1997); Jeffers v.
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 210 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
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atic of a widespread pattern of such conduct in covered or noncovered regions as a
whole.
To be sure, the Section 2 findings reflect the limitations that inhere in reliance
on published Section 2 case law as a source for describing opportunities for political participation nationwide.124 Judicial application of the Senate Factors in published Section 2 decisions offers selective snapshots of participation in the respective jurisdictions, not a comprehensive and systematic overview. And yet, the inability of these findings to satisfy the Boerne standard, at least in its strongest
form, stems not simply from the inherent limits of the data set. In fact, no source
will document the widespread pattern of unconstitutional conduct the Boerne decisions demand because official discrimination in covered jurisdictions is no longer
as prevalent as it once was.
This assertion will alarm proponents of reauthorization who believe the continued validity of Section 5 depends on such a record. This belief, however, is
mistaken. Section 5 is fundamentally different from the statutes at issue in the
Boerne cases, and this difference renders the Boerne doctrine inapplicable to reauthorization, at least in the sense that the prevailing discussion seems to assume.
All the Boerne decisions involved the question whether a problem Congress
sought to address was significant enough to warrant a new congressional statute.
In that context, documentation of pervasive unconstitutional conduct signals a
problem in need of a remedy. By contrast, reauthorization of an existing statute
presents a distinct question. The issue is not whether a new statute is needed, but
instead whether an existing one should continue. Here, the Court should not require evidence of widespread unconstitutional conduct because the statute at issue
is already operational. Section 5, after all, was put in place more than forty years
ago to address precisely the type of pervasive discrimination the Boerne cases
demand for new legislation. As a consequence, the validity of reauthorization cannot depend on evidence that such discrimination persists largely unchanged. To
require otherwise would limit reauthorization to statutes that are ineffectual.
Put differently, Section 5’s very success in addressing racial discrimination in
voting is itself neither proof that preclearance has become obsolete nor license for
the statute to continue indefinitely. The question whether preclearance is still
needed depends not on a raw assessment of the present scope of unconstitutional
conduct in covered jurisdictions, but instead on a predictive judgment about the
likely prevalence of such conduct absent the constraints imposed by Section 5.
This question can only be answered through speculation about whether Section 5
has achieved its goals, broadly understood.
For four decades, the preclearance requirement has sought to suppress manifestations of racial discrimination in voting by “shift[ing] the advantages of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”125 The hope, however,
was that Section 5 would do even more. Because Congress enacted Section 5 as a
temporary measure and repeatedly extended it for only circumscribed periods,
124
125

See supra note 14.
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
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preclearance is necessarily premised on the belief that controlling the symptoms of
racial discrimination can ultimately cure the underlying disease. In this sense, Section 5 might be understood as a behavior modification program, one designed not
simply to check certain conduct during the pendency of the program but instead to
bring about lasting changes in behavior and attitude.
Without doubt, Section 5 has been extraordinarily successful in controlling
discrimination in voting. While blatantly unconstitutional conduct has hardly been
eradicated, contemporary manifestations of racial discrimination in voting are jarring precisely because they are no longer the norm, as they were before Section 5
was implemented.126 Less clear is whether Section 5 has successfully achieved its
larger ambition not simply to suppress discrimination in voting but to change the
attitudes that, if left unchecked, give rise to the behavior. The overall decline in
unconstitutional conduct no doubt stems, at least in part, from changed attitudes.127
And yet, the need to traverse the preclearance process, as well as simply the prospect of needing to do so, inevitably constrains discriminatory behavior to a significant degree.128
Here, the Section 2 decisions offer some basis to consider how covered jurisdictions might look absent Section 5. On the one hand, judicial findings in many
Section 2 cases suggest fundamentally changed attitudes. Section 2 findings
document successful minority candidacies for a range of public offices in covered
jurisdictions, with minority electoral representation exceeding proportional representation in some areas.129 These findings record instances in which minority candidates run successfully not just from majority-minority districts, but in at-large
elections and districts in which minority voters do not comprise a majority of voters.130
126
See, e.g., Shirt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1024–28; Charleston County, 316 F. Supp. 2d
at 286 n.23.
127
See, e.g., Kevin Sack, In the Rural White South, Seeds of a Biracial Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998, at A1.
128
See, e.g., Tex. H.J. (78th Sess., 11th day, Oct. 10, 2003) (statement by Representative Phil King) (“quite frankly, it’s very, very difficult to draw a district in South Texas
because of the Voting Rights Act and the only way you can do it, is to do it in the manner
in which we did”); Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (“By
the time the plan now under attack was first proposed, the Voting Rights Act had effectively taken six Democratic Party seats off the table, rendering them untouchable . . . ”);
see also Pamela S. Karlan, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance Under the Voting Rights Act, at 16 (June 14, 2006), American Constitution Society Issue Briefs,
http://www.acslaw.org/node/2964 (“Jurisdictions that know that a change will not be
precleared may decide not even to attempt making it.”).
129
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
130
Boddie v. City of Cleveland, 297 F. Supp. 2d 901, 908 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (minority success in city and countywide elections); NAACP v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 371 (5th
Cir. 2001) (minority success in at-large election where black voting age population was
26.88%); City of Rome, 127 F.3d at 1384 n.18 (finding that meaningful “biracial coalitions” exist and promote successful minority and minority-preferred candidates); see also
Issacharoff, supra note 3, at 1714 (noting that “the major Supreme Court cases of the past
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Section 2 findings, moreover, document that minority voters in some covered
jurisdictions register and vote “without hindrance,” and in some areas do so at a
rate comparable to or greater than that of white residents.131 Courts have documented numerous instances in which public services are distributed in a nondiscriminatory manner, as well as instances in which some minority neighborhoods
receive greater services than nonminority ones. Courts have found that elected
officials in various covered jurisdictions are generally responsive to the needs of
the minority community.132 Compared, moreover, to the first years after Section 2
was amended, fewer courts in recent years have found covered (and noncovered)
jurisdictions using “enhancing devices” and fewer have found legally significant
racial bloc voting in these jurisdictions.133 Finally, since 1982 courts in covered
jurisdictions have documented fewer, albeit not to a statistically significant degree,
instances of official intentional discrimination as well as fewer Section 2 violations that simultaneously violated the Constitution than courts in noncovered jurisdictions.134
Taken together, these findings may well suggest a vital new way of thinking
in covered jurisdictions. And yet, because these developments occurred in communities subject to the constraints imposed by Section 5, and, without doubt, were
shaped by them,135 the question arises whether they would persist in the absence of
the preclearance process. That courts in covered jurisdictions have not documented extensive intentional racial discrimination of the sort Congress meant Section 5 to block may mean nothing more than that Section 5 is fulfilling its most
basic mission, namely, blocking covered jurisdictions from “pour[ing] old poison
into new bottles.”136
Indeed, a broader comparison of the judicial findings in covered and noncovered jurisdictions suggests caution before concluding that preclearance has transformed the sentiments that long propelled discriminatory conduct in covered jurisdictions. This comparison shows that distinct vestiges of discrimination persist in
decade addressing minority representation, beginning with Shaw v. Reno, have all arisen
from claims of southern politics being too solicitous of minority political claims.”).
131
McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1135 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
132
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 722.
133
See text accompanying supra note 55; see also supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
134
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
135
See Peyton McCrary, C. Seaman and R. Valelly, The End of Preclearance as We
Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 297–99 (2006) (finding that the preclearance process has repeatedly blocked proposed electoral changes based on evidence of bad intent); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.
J. 21, 36 (2004) (arguing that “the gains minority voters have achieved over the last four
reapportionment cycles . . . have all occurred in the shadow of Section 5, which has given
minority voters and their representatives an invaluable bargaining chip”).
136
Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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covered jurisdictions such that the elimination of Section 5 would hardly be inconsequential.
Of particular note is that covered jurisdictions account for the majority of the
Section 2 lawsuits in which plaintiffs achieved successful outcomes since 1982.137
This greater success is noteworthy given that the opposite trend might have been
anticipated. Less than one-quarter of the U.S. population resides in covered jurisdictions,138 courts in the region arguably apply standards that make success on a
Section 2 claim more difficult,139 and the preclearance process blocks some portion of discriminatory electoral changes that might otherwise be challenged under
Section 2.
To be sure, Section 2 and Section 5 are not coextensive, with each proscribing
some conduct that would be permissible under the other.140 Still, they are not
wholly distinct, and a large number of electoral practices run afoul of both provisions. Where they do, preclearance should block such practices as retrogressive
and thereby eliminate the need for plaintiffs to challenge them under Section 2. As
a result, if governmental officials in each jurisdiction have equal propensity to
engage in conduct prohibited by Section 2, one might have anticipated a greater
number of successful Section 2 lawsuits in noncovered jurisdictions, where, by
definition, preclearance does not operate. More Section 2 plaintiffs have nevertheless succeeded in covered jurisdictions even though a narrower range of practices
is likely to be challenged under Section 2.
This phenomenon is most pronounced at the local level, where most objections interposed by the Department of Justice in the preclearance process have
been made.141 Even in this context, where preclearance operates most vigorously

137
See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 13, at 655–56 (noting
sixty-eight successful plaintiffs’ outcomes in covered jurisdictions and fifty-five elsewhere).
138
The raw numbers are 67,767,900 out of 281,421,906 (24% of the U.S. population). See U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000, Demographic Profiles: 100%
and Sample Data: Demographic Profile Data Search, http://censtats.census. gov/pub/Profiles.shtml (last visited September 14, 2006). In addition, these data show that 39.3% of
African Americans, 31.8% of Hispanics or Latinos, and 24.8% of Native Americans in
the United States live in Section 5-covered areas. Id. (Demographic Data Profiles,
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/demoprofiles.html (last visited September 14, 2006)).
139
See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Clements, 999 F.2d
831, 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (requiring plaintiffs prove race caused polarized voting trends in order to satisfy the third Gingles precondition); see also Elizabeth Ryan,
Note, Post-LULAC Section 2 Claims in the Fifth Circuit, 105 MICH. L. REV.___ (2006)
(forthcoming unpublished manuscript at 34, on file with author) (concluding that in the
post-LULAC 5th Circuit, “[w]henever a defendant can introduce evidence of non-racial
factors . . . plaintiffs lose”).
140
See supra note 10 and notes 32–37 and surrounding text.
141
See Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to
Samuel Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L.
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to block electoral changes, covered jurisdictions still are the subject of more successful Section 2 challenges than are noncovered jurisdictions, where preclearance
is not screening out any of the challenges to local practices.142
A comparison of the underlying judicial findings in Section 2 litigation helps
explain the greater number of successful Section 2 claims in covered jurisdictions.
Compared with courts in noncovered jurisdictions, more courts in covered jurisdictions have documented evidence of nonactionable bias, that is, racially discriminatory conduct that violates no law, generally because private actors are engaging in it. Examples include more extreme levels of racial bloc voting and more
election campaigns featuring racial appeals. Courts in covered jurisdictions have
also identified as salient various vestiges of discrimination at a higher rate,
namely, circumstances that are reasonably likely to follow from past active discrimination, such as depressed levels of minority voter registration and turnout,
and the persistence of racial segregation found to hinder minority political participation.143
More courts have found a history of official discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones, a finding that helps explain why more
courts find nonactionable bias and salient vestiges of discrimination in covered
jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. More courts in covered jurisdictions than in
noncovered ones have documented the use of various electoral “devices” that enhance opportunities for discrimination against minority groups, devices that give
expression to nonactionable bias and exacerbate the impact of various vestiges of
past discrimination. All these factors contribute to a lack of minority candidate
success, a finding consistently made by more courts in covered jurisdictions than
in noncovered ones.144
None of this, of course, establishes a contemporary constitutional violation.145
Section 2’s totality of circumstance inquiry nevertheless calls for examination
based on the view that things like nonactionable bias, the vestiges of discrimination, historic official discrimination in voting, and the employment of practices
that enhance opportunities for discrimination all impede minority political participation and render electoral practices more likely to result in actionable discrimination against minority groups. While this actionable discrimination is not necessarily unconstitutional discrimination, the reasons that render these problems probative of a Section 2 violation also make them indicia of an environment in which

REV. 605, 612 (2005) (arguing that the greatest impact of Section 5 and the VRA has
been to police voting discrimination at the local level).
142
See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
143
See supra notes 50–54, 70–72, and 81–84 and accompanying text.
144
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
145
As amended, Section 2’s “results”-based test for discrimination in voting goes
beyond what the Constitution alone proscribes. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55, 60–61 (1980).
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past unconstitutional conduct has yet to be fully remedied and future constitutional
injuries may arise.146
The Supreme Court has so recognized, or, more precisely, affirmed Congress’s power to make this determination. Katzenbach v. Morgan147 upheld the ban
on literacy tests set forth in Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, because
such tests excluded members of New York City’s Puerto Rican community from
casting a ballot. The concern was both that the tests themselves were the product
of prohibited discrimination and that the use of such tests fostered “discrimination
in governmental services.”148 Morgan recognizes congressional power to ban this
literacy test both as a remedy for past discrimination and also to protect the people
the test excluded from future governmental discrimination. Morgan posits that
people denied access to the franchise are more likely to confront such discrimination, and accordingly upholds congressional power to enact Section 4(e) because
doing so “enhanced political power [that] will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.”149
City of Boerne v. Flores is known, in part, for its rejection of a distinct proposition long linked with Morgan, specifically, the suggestion that Congress may
enact legislation that “expands” rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150
Boerne, however, assiduously affirmed the two rationales for Morgan’s holding,
namely, congressional power to ban New York’s English literacy test as a remedial measure for official discrimination in establishing voter qualification,151 and
congressional power to ban the test as a mechanism to address future discrimination in public services.152
Boerne and Morgan accordingly provide a framework under which the Supreme Court might uphold the reauthorization of Section 5 as both a remedial
measure and a measure to block future discrimination. To be sure, Sections 4(e)
and 5 are distinct, with one blocking an English literacy test as a prerequisite to
voting and the other preventing covered jurisdictions from implementing any electoral change without first obtaining preclearance. Boerne, however, was careful to
affirm the legitimacy not only of Section 4(e) but also of Section 5, which the decision presents as the paradigm of congruent and proportional congressional legislation.
146

Cf. Hasen, supra note 8, at 190–94 (arguing that a potential for mischief is not
the same as mischief itself and that nonstate action evidence is not a constitutionally acceptable substitute for evidence of intentional discrimination).
147
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
148
Id. at 653.
149
Id. at 652.
150
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997) (noting language in
Morgan that “could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and
finding that “[a]ny suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under
the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our caselaw.”).
151
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528; Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
152
521 U.S. 507, 528 (1996). See also Katz, supra note 108, at 2395–96.
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Whether Section 5 remains so after reauthorization is a complex and difficult
question. Judicial findings in Section 2 lawsuits since 1982 attest to much of what
Section 5 has accomplished. A comparison of these findings from covered and
noncovered jurisdictions nevertheless suggests the many ways in which relevant
differences persist.

III. Conclusion
Federal judges adjudicating Section 2 claims are not social scientists. Their
charge is not to produce a comprehensive portrait of political participation nationwide or even in the jurisdictions where electoral practices have been challenged. Section 2’s totality of circumstances test functions instead much like a
camera, distributed to courts in Section 2 litigation with instructions to photograph specific items. A quarter-century after the 1982 amendments to Section 2,
federal judges have produced thousands of snapshots that offer selective but still
probative images of political participation in covered and noncovered jurisdictions.
The quality of these images depends on various factors. These include the
skill and diligence of, and resources available to, the attorneys involved in Section
2 litigation, as well as judicial predilections for interpreting the Voting Rights Act
narrowly or expansively, for making detailed findings, and for publishing decisions that are reached. To the extent, however, that these factors vary in similar
ways in covered and noncovered jurisdictions, the differences between the judicial
findings in Section 2 lawsuits in these jurisdictions suggest real differences operating on the ground in these regions.
The significance of these differences is a matter of debate. But it is a debate
about differences such as these that we should be having. The debate about the
validity of reauthorization has instead focused for too long on the wrong question.
The scope of unconstitutional conduct in covered jurisdictions cannot tell us
whether preclearance is still needed. The debate should focus on evidence that
might be more definitive given that the validity of reauthorization turns on it.

Appendix
Table 8.1. Total Lawsuits and Success in Voting Rights Act Section 2
Litigation, 1982–2005
Covered Jurisdictions
Year Decided

Total Lawsuits

Success

% Success

1980s

59

35

59.3%

1990s

72

27

37.5%

2000s

29

6

20.7%

Grand Total

160

68

42.5%

Noncovered Jurisdictions
Year Decided

Total Lawsuits

Success

% Success

1980s

41

21

51.2%

1990s

84

23

27.4%

2000s

46

11

23.9%

Grand Total

171

55

32.2%

a

Overall
Year Decided

Total Lawsuits

Success

% Success

1980s

100

56

56.0%

1990s

156

50

32.1%

2000s

75

17

22.7%

Grand Total

331

123

37.2%

a
The chi-square value analyzing the contingency table with covered/noncovered jurisdictions versus successful/unsuccessful grand total is 3.782 (df = 1, p = 0.052).
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).
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Table 8.2. Senate Factor Findings in Post–1982 Section 2 Litigation,
of All Suits Considering Factors
Covered
Jurisdictions
Total
Lawsuits

171

100%

105
65.6%
131
Of Suits Considering Factors:
Found Factor 1
61
58.1%
50
Found Factor 2
52
49.5%
53
Found Factor 3
33
31.4%
19
Found Factor 4
4
3.8%
6
Found Factor 5
45
42.9%
43
Found Factor 6
18
17.1%
15
Found Factor 7
51
48.6%
39
Found Factor 8
10
9.5%
10
Found Factor 9
13
12.4%
10
All Gingles
Factors
30
28.6%
38

76.6%

Considered
Factors

160

100%

Noncovered
Jurisdictions

38.2%
40.5%
14.5%
4.6%
32.8%
11.5%
29.8%
7.6%
7.6%

p>χ2
0.002
0.164
0.002
0.975
0.113
0.210
0.003
0.604
0.222

29.0%

0.941

Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).
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Table 8.3. Local v. State Government Challenges under Section 2,
1982–2005a
Covered
Jurisdictions
Level of Gov’t
State
Local
County
City/Town
Schoolb
Total

Total
38
122
47
54
21
160

Success
11
28.9%
57
46.7%
26
55.3%
25
46.3%
6
28.6%
68
42.5%

Level of Gov’t
State
Local
County
City/Town
Schoolb
Total

Noncovered
Jurisdictions
Total
58
113
44
55
14
171

15
40
16
20
4
55

Success
25.9%
35.4%
36.4%
36.4%
28.6%
32.2%

Test of Differencec
p>χ2
0.739
0.078
0.070
0.292
0.703
0.052

a
This figure displays the governing body challenged. Where suits challenged multiple governments, the highest level is counted.
b
The chi-square value for this level of government is Yates continuity-corrected.
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).
c
Chi-square values for each level of government analyze contingency tables for covered/noncovered jurisdictions versus successful/ unsuccessful results.
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Table 8.4. Types of Electoral Practices Challenged under Section 2,
1982–2005a
Jurisdiction
Covered
Noncovered
Total

Jurisdiction
Covered
Noncovered
Total

Jurisdiction
Covered
Noncovered
Total

At-Large Elections
Total
% of Suits Success
77
47.8%
39
69
40.6%
28
146
44.1%
67
Chi-square = 1.486; p > χ 2 = 0.223
Reapportionment Plans
Total
% of Suits Success
49
30.4%
27
62
36.5%
19
111
33.5%
46
Chi-square = 6.746; p > χ 2 = 0.009
Majority-Vote Requirements
Total
% of Suits Success
10
6.2%
5
3
1.8%
1
13

3.9%

6

% Success
50.6%
40.6%
45.9%

% Success
55.1%
30.6%
41.4%

% Success
50.0%
33.3%
46.2%

b

Chi-square = 0.023 ; p > χ 2 = 0.879
a

Note that some lawsuits included a challenge to more than one practice simultaneously. Chi-square values for each electoral practice analyze contingency tables for covered/noncovered jurisdictions versus successful/unsuccessful results.
b
The chi-square value reported for this electoral practice is Yates continuitycorrected.
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Table 8.4. cont.

Jurisdiction
Covered
Noncovered
Total

Jurisdiction
Covered
Noncovered
Total

Election Admin. Procedures
Total
% of Suits
Success
20
12.4%
5
21
12.4%
9
41
12.4%
14
Chi-square = 1.453; p > χ 2 = 0.228

Total
17
22
39

Otherc
% of Suits
Success
10.6%
0
12.9%
0
11.8%

0

% Success
25.0%
42.9%
34.1%

% Success
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

d

Chi-square = N/A .
c

Other practices include: felon disfranchisement statutes, annexations, appointment
procedures.
d
No chi-square value is reported for this factor.
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).
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Table 8.5. Level of White Bloc Voting in Elections Documented in
Section 2 Litigation 1982–2005a
Covered Jurisdictions
Whites Voting
Number of
as a Bloc
Elections
% of Elections
90-100%
106
52.5%
80-89%
57
28.2%
80% WBV or higher:
80.7%
70-79%
22
10.9%
70% WBV or higher:
91.6%
60-69%
13
6.4%
50-59%
4
2.0%
Total Elections
202
100.0%
Noncovered jurisdictions
Whites Voting
Number of
as a Bloc
Elections
% of Elections
90-100%
46
17.9%
80-89%
59
23.0%
80% WBV or higher:
40.9%
70-79%
58
22.6%
70% WBV or higher:
63.4%
60-69%
61
23.7%
50-59%
33
12.8%
Total Elections
257
100.0%
a
Election data for this figure was collected from 105 lawsuits that found legally significant racially polarized voting. Some courts provided no election data with their finding. Elections showing 50% or less white bloc voting were rarely discussed by courts (six
elections in covered, and five in noncovered), and so were not included here.
The chi-square value analyzing the contingency table with covered/noncovered jurisdictions versus 80% WBV or higher/79% WBV or lower categories is 73.876 (df = 1,
p = 2.2*10^(-16)).
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org (2006).
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Table 8.6. Changes v. Longstanding Electoral Practices Challenged
Under Section 2, 1982–2005a
Covered Jurisdictions
% Suits Success % Success

Type of Challenge
Longstanding/
Implementation

Total
86

53.8%

35

40.7%

Reapportionment
Other Change
Total Changes

49
25
74

30.6%
15.6%
46.3%

27
7
34

55.1%
28.0%
45.9%

Total

160

100.0%

69

43.1%

Noncovered Jurisdictions
% Suits Success % Success

Type of Challenge
Longstanding/
Implementation

Total
79

46.2%

24

30.4%

Reapportionment
Other Change
Total Changes

62
30
92

36.3%
17.5%
53.8%

19
11
30

30.6%
36.7%
32.6%

Total

171

100.0%

54

31.6%

Type of Challenge
Longstanding / Implementation

Test of Difference
p>χ2
0.167

Reapportionment
Other Change
Total Changes

0.009
0.495
0.079

Total

0.030

a
This Figure compares the total number and success rate of suits challenging longstanding practices (including implementation), with the same for newly enacted practices.
All challenges where the date of enactment is unclear are included in the old category.
Source: Ellen D. Katz & The Voting Rights Initiative, www.votingreport.org
(2006).

